Labour can win an election. It just has to learn from the past

With the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party, various pundits, advisers, and expressers of opinions leapt into the fray to offer their unwanted views on why Corbyn would be a disaster for the party. And when Labour lost disastrously in the 2019 general election, a new generation of pundits offered their personal views, each one giving a completely different explanation from all the other experts.

Some were giving little more than a personal opinion, simply what they believed. And perhaps those beliefs were merely a reflection of their own particular biases, fears and obsessions. Tony Blair spoke of Labour’s ‘comic indecision’ over Brexit, and warned that the party is ‘finished’ unless it ditches the far-left,” (Dominic Yeatman. Metro. December 19 2019.)

But the full story is more complex. However, here are a few notes to consider. “Insiders complain of clashing egos, confused messaging, and an infuriating lack of clarity…” (Heather Stewart. The Guardian. December 14 2019.) The prevarication in the row over anti-semitism was partly a symptom of a divided party, and partly Corbyn’s inability to make a decision about what should be the party’s response to the allegations. It allowed myriad malicious interpretations to be made, each of which ate into what was left of Labour’s credibility. Corbyn’s eventual decision was almost the worst possible reaction.

Many of the accusations levelled at Labour have a ring of truth to them. In Scotland and the North of England, Labour’s share of the vote in the 2019 election collapsed. Given that Labour had taken voters in Scotland and the North of England for granted for decades, this is not surprising, but it is not good campaign practice. In Derbyshire it is said that Labour hardly bothered to campaign. And it was probably not only in Derbyshire that this happened.

David Miliband, brother of Ed Miliband, said “We underestimated our opponents and moved into the comfort zone of talking to ourselves.” (David Miliband. The Guardian. December 23 2019.) If anyone “underestimated our opponents” they really hadn’t been paying attention. The Tories had, since 1979, shown themselves to be skilled at promoting their candidates, their policies, and their alleged competence. If Labour had “moved into the comfort zone of talking to ourselves,” (op. cit.) as a response to losing the election, or as a standard operating procedure, it is an understandable human reaction, but it is not the way to win elections. Elections should be about the reality of what are the electorate’s opinions, how strongly do they feel for or against certain policies, what messages are the opposition putting out, and what density of messaging is being applied.

There are various ways to improve a candidate’s or a party’s chances of winning an election; an effective campaign, a hard-working and persuasive candidate, attractive policies, and, for a sitting representative, working hard for one’s constituents. It would appear that Labour had not chosen that last item in many parts of the UK. In fact, all it had to offer were good candidates.

Labour’s first notable failing was in choosing Jeremy Corbyn to be its leader. He was unable to be clear about his stance on Brexit, he was unable to apologise for the anti-semitism in the Labour Party, and there was no visible sign that he was working to eliminate anti-semitism in his party. He was asked repeatedly to explain his views on Brexit, and he repeatedly failed to do so. He was also asked to apologise for the anti-semitism in the party, and when he finally did so, some said that Corbyn was not clear as to whom he was apologising to, and what he was apologising for. He was learning on the job, but he was not learning fast enough.

There is no doubt that the right-wing press played a significant role in demonising Corbyn, but perhaps, in response to that, Corbyn should have moderated his left-wing extremism, rather than making a point of announcing views that many people disagreed with. Mary Creagh, who lost her seat as an MP in the 2019 election, said that canvassing door to door she found that Corbyn was five times as unpopular as any other factor.

It is natural that Corbyn should have left-wing views, which as long as they are acceptable on the doorstep while canvassing, are acceptable for a party leader. But when some opinions are not only viewed with suspicion, but have been thoroughly demonised by the right-wing media, it would be sensible to put them aside and concentrate on policies that make up a coherent and popular platform.

Corbyn gave the impression of being very inflexible, unwilling to change his mind or his stance on any policy, or offer a well-thought out response to any criticism. He seemed to think that stonewalling any attacks with clichés, slogans and boilerplate would satisfy or put off the delicate creatures of Fleet Street. After all, they didn’t harass Boris for clear answers on every mumbled slogan or vague claim. Why should they want specifics from him?

Tony Blair tries to put all the blame on Corbyn, which is both unfair and simplistic. There were flaws in the party going right back to Blair’s premiership, it’s just that Blair was good at winning elections, whereas Corbyn is probably not. But Blair saddled the party with a burdensome reputation for dishonesty. Blair’s reasons for joining George W. Bush’s war on Iraq were bad enough, but the so-called “dodgy dossier” was almost like admitting the war was a fraud.

Bush alleged that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as toxic or biological chemicals or even nuclear weapons, and that there was an alliance between Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq and al-Qaeda. This was subsequently disproved. Blair later claimed that the invasion of Iraq was justified on humanitarian grounds; that Saddam had gassed his own people. But that would be regime change, which is illegal under international law. In 2004 he put forward his latest defence, which The Guardian summarised on the front page as, “If we ignore threats, we are in mortal danger.” (The Guardian. March 6 2004.) But it depends how real the threats are, and how serious they are. Even at the time there was no evidence that Saddam was a threat to anyone, other than his own people.

A little closer to home, almost exactly four years earlier, Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, put forward a bill to “remove the right of trial by jury in all criminal cases.” (Peter Oborne. The Rise of Political Lying. p68.) He claimed that the bill had the support of the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham. This claim gave the impression that the bill was not merely properly drawn up, but was also legally impeccable. But Lord Bingham had written to Straw arguing that that the bill’s intent to “strip magistrates of the broad discretion to take the circumstances of the accused into account” was harmful. So at the very least, Straw did not have Bingham’s full support.

Oborne is somewhat scathing about Blair’s honesty, a quality which he clearly thinks is limited. In Oborne’s view, Blair created an aggressive form of news management, which would, “harass, bully, lie and smear in order to ensure that the government made its case.” (Peter Oborne. The Rise of Political Lying. p150.) If we ignore the ethical issues, there is still the damage to trust and to the party’s reputation. This may have been a factor in Labour’s losing the 2010 election, and may also have been part of the explanation as to why Labour lost the 2019 election. Corbyn’s procrastination and reluctance to take a clear stand on either Brexit or anti-semitism made people wonder if Labour had a clear stance, and was trustworthy.

But also, there was little to draw voters to Labour. At some point in 2019, the leadership of the Labour party had decided that its platform would be a smorgasbord of diverse and unrelated policies, each of which gave the impression that they had been designed to make voters say, “Well, I never.” What would have been nice was if Labour had proposed a limited range of policies which cumulatively formed a coherent platform. And in addition, if it had then sold both the policies and the overarching vision to the electorate. Thatcher put “the market” at the centre of British economic policy, and justified much of her legislation with the easily swallowed domestic metaphor of, ‘the economy is like a home.’ It’s not of course, it’s more like 30 million interdependent homes, and each of us relies for our income on the spending of the other 29 million.

Which brings us to another characteristic of elections; one doesn’t campaign only at elections. Watching Tory MPs discussing almost any issue since 2010, one might hear them expostulating about the struggles of the NHS, the need to go ahead with HS2, or the importance of cutting the welfare benefit budget. No matter what the supposed subject, the loyal party MP would say that the policy had to be followed because of “Labour’s wild spending,” or because of the “massive debt” that Labour had burdened the country with.

Every day, every week, every month, Conservative spokespersons would be answering the questions of the day, presenting each one in the context of what Labour had done, and why Labour’s mistakes had made difficult choices, even unpleasant choices, become unavoidable choices. Speaking more in sorrow than in anger - apparently - Tory MPs would describe the rock and the hard place which Labour had led the country to, and claim that they, as the government, had limited options.

Covertly, and under the Labour Party’s radar, the Tories were running an election campaign. But one with no restrictions on spending, air time, accuracy, or honesty. And by repeating the message over and over again, with nobody ever refuting it, naturally the average voter concluded that it must be true. The UK economy was in a terrible state, and it was all Labour’s fault.

It would seem that Labour had not noticed this Tory habit, nor had it felt the need to refute this constant diet of lies, deception, and misleading statements. This is quite surprising, as one would expect Labour Party MPs – and ordinary members – to be angry at being slandered constantly. It would be especially offensive given that Labour had led the worldwide stimulus programme to fight off the recession, and that the debt was incurred paying for the stimulus.

As it was, the belief that Labour had been spending irresponsibly was deeply embedded in the public’s consciousness. With no election in sight for years, the Conservatives had established in the electorate’s mind, the “fact”, the claim that Labour was responsible for all the problems in the British economy. This must have added enormous weight to the public’s reluctance to vote Labour.

And finally, Labour had ignored its constituents. Whether or not the Conservatives do a good job for their constituency is not an issue. If they don’t, they can get away with it. They have campaigned all year, and Central Office and the media have done a thorough job of presenting the Tory Party nationally in a good light. A local MP probably doesn’t need to do any more. But a Labour MP doesn’t have the support of the media behind them, so has to work a little bit harder.

This is especially true of novice MPs. They need to start their career in by pumping old hands for information about Parliament, focusing on the easiest and most effective ways of helping a constituent with a welfare benefit claim, intransigent bureaucrats, and all the other issues that may arrive in the ordinary person’s life. Then they need to train whatever staff is provided by the House in using those skills of helping constituents, just in case the workload becomes too heavy.

There is a lot to do, particularly after 10 years of austerity, and with an unhelpful, even punitive Department for Work and Pensions. And as Theresa May well knew, there were many who were “only just managing.” They all need MPs help.

Ultimately, the 2019 election was one that Labour MPs should have had in their pocket. By dint of doing just about everything wrong, Labour managed to lose that election. Let us hope that they learn all the lessons that are to be learnt.